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Hindu Nationalism and the (Not So
Easy) Art of Being Outraged: The 
Ram Setu Controversy
Christophe Jaffrelot
1 Religious outrage has triggered collective violence in pre-modern India, as C. Bayly has
shown in its seminal work on the ‘pre-history of communalism’ (Bayly 1985): heads of
pigs were found in mosques, followers of Islam offered cows in sacrifice during Id, Hindu
processions  passed  by  mosques  while  playing  music  during  the  prayer  time…  The
meaning of such ‘rituals of provocation’—to use Marc Gaborieau’s expression (Gaborieau
1985)—changed with the crystallization of communal ideologies. Then, these stratagems
acquired a political dimension. They were still used to provoke riots but the polarization
of society they were intended to create was often supposed to translate into votes, for
instance. In this paper I shall address this issue not from the point of view of violence, but
from  that  of  mobilization  by  asking  one  (twofold)  question:  how  can  the  Hindutva
movement shape or manipulate religious forms of outrage in order to attract supporters
and is the sacred dimension of the outrage the most critical one?
2 Hindu nationalists cultivate the art of being outraged when elements of their religion are
affected. They promptly denounce ‘attacks’ against sacred symbols of Hinduism: any
disrespect can be portrayed as blasphemy and lay itself to popular mobilizations—which
may  translate  into  votes.  Hindu  nationalist  politicians  have  always  been  eager  to
instrumentalise so-called outrageous situation at the time of elections. Agitations against
cow slaughter in 1967 and for (re)building the Ram temple in Ayodhya in 1989, a few
months before general elections in both occurrences,  are cases in point.  In 1967,  the
Sangh Parivar—through the newly created Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and its party, the
Jana Sangh—mobilized thousands of demonstrators in New Delhi to protest against the
outrage to Hinduism that cow-slaughter represented—a practice still legal in a few states
and which the Sangh Parivar accused the Muslims to indulge in at the time of Bakr Id
(Graham 1990: 147-155).  In 1989, the same groups orchestrated a similar campaign in
defence of Ram, the Hindu god perceived to have been humiliated by the construction of
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the Babri Masjid of Ayodhya, his allegedly historical capital where the temple built on his
birthplace had been replaced by the Moghols with this mosque.
3 A purely instrumentalist interpretation, however, is not sufficient. The Hindu nationalist
culture of outrage cannot be understood irrespective of its psychological context. It is
part  of  a  discourse  of  victimization  which  is  the  very  matrix  of  Hindu  nationalism
(Jaffrelot: 1996). This ideology was shaped in the late 19th century as a reaction to a strong
feeling of vulnerability. Hindus, though in a majority, were seen by its proponents as
weak, compared to the Muslims, because of their inner divisions along caste and sectarian
lines. This majoritarian complex of inferiority made Hindu nationalist leaders prompt to
outcry as soon as some of their sacred identity symbols were ‘under attack’ because of
religious minorities, be they Muslim or Christian.
4 The controversy about the Ram Setu, the last ‘outrage’ to date affecting Hinduism (from
the point of view of the Sangh Parivar) exemplifies this pattern. But it complexifies it since
the Hindutva leaders appear to be less concerned by the sacred character of this identity
symbol than by its historical quality. It also shows that the enemy responsible for the
victimization of the Hindus may not be Muslims or Christians, but the State and the lower
castes—then, fighting the so-called outrage may be more complicated. Last but not least,
it is revealing of the Hindu nationalists’ quest for non-religious (and even non-historical)
reasons for defending an object of outrage: the Ram Setu also had to be defended for
economic and strategic reasons.
 
The Ram Setu controversy: outraging the sacred,
popular agitation and the victimization discourse
5 Ram Setu is the name of the bridge that is supposed to link South India to Sri Lanka since
the Ramayana. According to this epic, it was built by Hanuman, the chief of Ram’s army, in
order to cross over the ocean and rescue Sita who had been abducted by Ravana. As early
as the 19th century, the British made plans to dredge this channel in order to enable big
ships to navigate along the Indian coast or to travel between the Eastern side of India
towards the Arabian Sea to use it. In 1838 efforts were made to this end for the first time,
but they did not succeed in making the passage navigable for big ships. Another plan was
made in 1860 but it was never implemented.1
6 Almost one century later,  in 1955, independent India constituted the Sethusamudram
Project Committee to examine the feasibility of dredging the canal connecting the Gulf of
Mannar with the Palk Bay. The Committee recommended that the canal project be linked
with the Tuticorin Harbour Project and that both projects be undertaken simultaneously.
In 1963, the government of India sanctioned the Tuticorin Harbour Project in order to
transform this deep sea port into a major maritime hub. But the Sethusamudram Project
was not taken further.
7 Tuticorin became a big harbour, but nothing compared to Colombo which developed into
a major container port. Colombo reached its full handling capacity in 1992 because it
could receive big international cargos and be used as a transhipment port.2 Tuticorin
could not replicate this success story because it could not be approached by big ships,
though it experienced a 17% per annum growth rate in the early 2000s.3 And the smaller
ones which reached it from the East coast of India had to go around Sri Lanka, travelling
500 extra kilometres and spending large amounts in fuel and crew charges. This state of
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things also raised a security problem since India was one of the few sovereign countries
which did not have a continuous navigable route for big ships in its own territorial water.
8 The supporters of the Sethusamudram Project also argued that it would help developing
backward districts of Tamil Nadu such as Tirunelveli and Ramanathapuram. The Project
was revived in 1983—to no avail—and again in 1994 when the government of Tamil Nadu
updated the project and detailed it. The government of A.B. Vajpayee, which was formed
in 1999 with the support of the National Democratic Alliance, a coalition led by the BJP,
took it up under pressure of its local ally, the All India Anna Dravida Khazagam (AIADMK).
In the 2000-2001 budget, Yashwant Sinha, the then Union Finance Minister, allocated 4.8
crore rupees for a feasibility study of the Sethusamudram project. The Project then begun
in 2004, under the NDA regime, when the Vajpayee government approved a 3,500 crore
rupees budget to create a shipping channel. The first concrete step, though, was taken
after the NDA lost the 2004 elections to the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance, by
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh who inaugurated the project on June 2, 2005. Dredging
started in July 2006.  Six dredgers worked between the mouth of the channel in Palk
Straits: Dredger XVI owned by Dredging Corp. Of India Ltd., Pacifique, owned by Belgium
based Dreging International, Banwari Prem and Triloki Prem owned by Mumbai-based
Vector Shipping Services Pvt. Ltd., Darya Manthan owned by Hong Kong-based Chellaram
Shipping Ltd., and Prof. Gurjanov owned by the Russia-based Baltdraga Ltd. (Narain 2008).
By July 2007, 17.57% of the Setusamudram Project had been achieved according to the
official Setusamudram Project government website. The completion rate reached 24,76%
in September 2007.
9 Hindu nationalists immediately denounced an attack against a sacred site.4 One of them,
Subramanian  Swamy,  went  to  the  Supreme  Court  with  a  written  petition.  The
government then filed a counter affidavit questioning the very existence of the Ram Setu
which, according to them, was purely mythical and legendary:
contents  of  the  Valmiki  Ramayana,  the  Ramcharitmanas  by  Tulsidas  and  other
mythological texts, which admittedly formed an important part of ancient Indian
literature [...] cannot be said to be historical record to incontrovertibly prove the
existence of the characters, or the occurrence of events depicted therein (The Indian
Express 2008).
10 This argument prepared the ground of a stronger reaction. Hindu nationalists built a




11 The weekly mouthpiece of the Sangh Parivar, The Organiser, devoted its Deepavali special
issue to the Ram Setu controversy late in 2007.  The 21 articles it  contained perfectly
illustrate the Hindu nationalist rhetoric that was articulated at that time. Gautam Sen,
one of the Sangh Parivar leaders in England, set the tone:
The dredging of the Ram Setu channel on the grounds that there was neither Ram
nor any historic bridge is simply outrageous. It is the equivalent of orphaning an
entire civilisation by denying the well-springs of its foundation (Sen 2007: 17).
12 What was at stake, of course, was the religious identity of Hindus. This point was made at
length by Sunita Vakil few pages afterwards:
It is quite saddening that the ruling party, by casting aspersions on the name of
Ram,  a  strong  symbol  of  Hindu faith,  is  trying  to  destruct  India’s  rich  cultural
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heritage and all [what] it stands for. By denying the existence of Lord Ram armed
with a non descript affidavit in the apex court, the Congress leaders have dealt a
heavy  blow to  the  collective  Hindu  psyche  besides  reducing  a  sacred  epic  that
defined Hindu identity and nationhood for ages, to a mere work of fiction (Vakil
2007: 52).
13 The words used to denounce the government’s disregard for such sacred symbols as Ram
and the Ram Setu were always the same: outrage, insult, humiliation, blasphemy etc. And
these attacks against Ram and the Ram Setu were equated with attacks against Hindus at
large, and even against their country. Among the contributors to the special issue of the
Deepavali issue of The Organiser, a Sanskrit scholar, Dr. Indulata Das writes: ‘Insult of Ram
is an insult to India’ (Das 2007: 36).
14 Naturally, the religious figures who had been invited to contribute to this special issue
emphasised  the  sacred  dimension  of  the  Ram  Setu even  more.  Swami  Nischalanda
Saraswati, the Shankaracharya of Puri wrote for instance:
We are  really  shocked that  the  existence  of  Sri  Ram and the  Ramayan is  being
disputed on this sacred land where this great hero took birth. It is not only meant
for  the  demolition  of  the  Ram  Setu but  also  backed  by  a  ploy  to  outrage  the
reputation, honour and self-pride of Hindu society (Saraswati 2007: 55).
15 Swami Dayananda Saraswati, another safron-clad ‘saintly’ figure, was even more explicit
about the implications of the sacredness of the Ram Setu in his fascinating speech as chief-
guest of the function organized for the release of Subramanian Swamy’s book, Ram Setu, a
Symbol of National Unity, on April 20, 2008:
Any destruction to the sacred Sethu would hurt the sentiments of crores of Hindus.
Any sentiment is sacred. No sentiments needs any logic, and sentiment is above all.
Therefore,  we  don’t  need  to  give  any  reason  for  our  attitude,  that  has  been
inherited since generations (Rath 2008: 9).
16 The sacredness of the Ram Setu was reason enough to denounce the outrageous attitude of
the government. 
17 Those  who  insisted  most  on  the  sacredness  of  the  Ram  Setu,  though,  were  activists
specialising  in  popular  mobilizations—be  they  religious  figures  or  politicians.  Ravi
Shankar Prasad,  the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)  National  spokeperson,  regarded the
government’s affidavit as an ‘humiliating insult to Lord Ram’ (Prasad 2007: 76) and Sadhvi
Rithambara,  one  of  the  most  vocal  VHP  saffron-clad  leaders,  denounced  its  ‘blatant
disregard  toward the  religious  sentiments  of  [the]  majority  community’  (Rithambara
2007: 62).
 
In search of a popular mobilization
18 The protest against so-called sacrilegious attacks against symbols of Hinduism generally
translates into calls to agitate. Indeed, the VHP leaders launched a mobilization campaign
under the aegis of Sadhvi Rithambara and Satyamitranand Giri. The former considered
that ‘the campaign to save Ram Setu should be of vital importance to any cultured person,
without any connection to political identity or ideological stand’ (Rithambara 2007: 63).
The latter launched his ‘most ardent appeal to the Indian society to embark once again
upon the path of satyagraha in order to protect the very existence of the Hindu culture
which is under serious threats. Let us all be prepared to lay down our lives if the need
arises to achieve this most sacred cause’ (Giri 2007: 65).
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19 The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) created a new organization only devoted to the
defence of the Ram Setu, the Rameshwaram Ram Setu Raksha Manch (The Rameshwaram
Association  for  the  Defence  of  Ram  Setu).  This  organization  initiated  an  agitation
campaign in Tamil Nadu. In September 2007, for instance, it resulted in the arrest of
activists of belonging to this movement and to the arrest of other activists belonging to
another  offshoot  of  the RSS,  the Hindu Janajagruti  Samiti  (Committee for  the Hindu
Renaissance).5 The agitation reached its culmination point in late December 2007 when
the Rameshwaram Ram Setu Raksha Manch organized a huge rally in Rohini (Delhi) on the
Swarna Jayanti Udyan grounds. It was attended by VHP leaders—including Ashok Singhal
(International President) and Pravin Togadia (International General Secretary) as well as
saffron—clad saintly figures—, BJP leaders—including the entire top brass of the party as
well as the Chief Ministers of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh, Uttarakhand and
Himachal Pradesh—and RSS leaders, amongst whom K. Sudarshan, the Sarsanghchalak
(supreme chief) (The Economic Times 2007).
 
The psychological context: a vulnerability syndrome
20 Outrage to the sacred is usually instrumentalised by ethno-political entrepreneurs from
the BJP and the VHP who attempt to mobilize—and gain followers—for a crucial cause.
But this particular mobilization and the motivations of its initiators have to be analysed
in the context of a general feeling of vulnerability. Traditionally, those who suffered from
this syndrome considered that it was Muslims who posed the greatest threat to Hinduism;
in the case of the Ram Setu, the Congress-led government was their first target because it
was accused of always appeasing the minorities at the expense of Hindus.
 
Hindus ‘under threat’
21 Sadhvi Rithambara, in the afore-mentioned article about the ‘attack’ against the Ram Setu
writes: ‘The current assault on our Hindu dharma is nothing new but an extension of
centuries of  unprovoked assaults.  Hindu history is  replete with accounts of  the most
atrocious attacks perpetrated on the peace loving Hindus in India’ (Rithambara 2007: 62).
For the Sangh Parivar, Hindus are—and have always been—victims of external assailants.
Over  the  years,  this  reading  of  history  percolated  and now finds  some echo  among
ordinary citizens who become thus sympathisers of the Hindutva forces. One of the letters
reproduced in the ‘readers’ forum’ of The Organiser illustrates this very well and deserves
to be quoted at length:
Tolerance is a great quality but not at the cost of wiping out the great religion [that
is  Hinduism].  Ram  Setu is  just  another  episode  in  this  vilified  and  dangerous
campaign. It is high time that some permanent solution is put up to mitigate the
sufferings of  Hindus.  Delhi  Metro’s  route alignment was changed so that  Qutub
Minar is not harmed; the Taj industrial corridor project is under legal stay so as to
preserve Taj Mahal and there are several other typical cases where minority card is
being played. But when it comes to a Hindu thought, psyche, religion or anything
associated  with  Hindu,  there  is  a  lot  of  demeaning,  defamation,  hurting  the
religious sentiments etc. (The Organiser 2007: 80). 
22 Another reader wrote: ‘The Hindu in India is faced with a unique situation. While he is
theoretically part of a majority, he is so fractured into various ideological groups that he
is virtually powerless to influence the politics of the country’(The Organiser 2007: 80).
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23 In contrast, according to Hindu nationalists, minorities form blocks which the political
parties are always keen on ‘pampering’. The Hindutva leaders traditionally argue that the
Congress plays vote bank politics and is especially keen to make concessions to Muslims
in order to get their support at the time of elections. But in the case of the Ram Setu,
Muslims were not involved and so their discourse had to be different.
 
Hindus against low caste Dravidians?
24 Subramanian  Swamy  argued  that  ‘the  UPA  is  an  anti-Hindu  government.  Because
Karunanidhi  is  an  atheist, and  UPA’s  puppeteer  Ms.  Sonia  Gandhi  is  a  Christian
fundamentalist, they together thought that they can demoralise the ordinary Hindu by
demolishing the Ram Setu’ (Swamy 2007: 69).
25 Sonia Gandhi’s rise to power, since she became president of the Congress party in 1997,
has been followed with great suspicion by the Hindu nationalists who predicted that she
would betray the Indian nation, not only because of her foreign origin, but also because of
her Catholic background. The myth of an anti-Hindu conspiracy of the minorities has
crystallised in this context and has been reactivated during the Ram Setu movement.
Referring to the government’s affidavit, Gautam Sen considered for instance that:
The subjection of their beliefs and history to some allegedly superior investigative
forensic science is merely an Islamo-Christian conspiracy signifying complete bad
faith (...). It is a diabolical intrigue that threatens to subjugate Hindus politically as
the  prelude  to  a  final  solution  that  will  impale  them  on  the  beliefs  of  their
imperialist conquerors (Sen 2007: 17). 
26 In the case of Karunanidhi, the accusation of being anti-Hindu is more complicated. He is
certainly ‘anti-Brahmin’! This Dravidian leader is the heir of a long Tamil tradition of
Brahmin-bashing harcking back to Periyar, the author of a corrosive book entitled The
Ramayana. A True Reading in 1959. In this book, that was banned in some parts of India,
Periyar  made  statements  which  were  much  more  provocative  than  those  of
Karunanidhi’s, especially when the former referred to Ram’s morality. But his anti-Ram
stances were in tune with the South Indian version of the Ramayana. In the Dravidian
states, Ram has never been such a popular deity. In fact, he has always been seen there as
a North Indian import and a symbol of the Aryan invasions. The Brahmins, who brought
Hinduism to the South, were accused of subjugating indigenous people and subjecting
them to a foreign civilization. In contrast, in Tamil Nadu at least, Ravana is a heroic son of
the soil, a Vedic scholar and an epitome of morality. Unlike who Ram questioned Sita’s
chastity, Ravana is presented in the Dravidian movement as a refined man—a connoiseur
of music—who abstained from manhandling Sita. Besides his deliberately anti-Brahmin
tirades,  Periyar  fought  for  Pahutu  arivu,  that  is  rationalism  against  Mooda  nambikai,
superstitions. This is why Swamy accuses him of being an atheist. 
27 During the  Ram Setu controversy,  Karunanidhi  followed a  purely  Dravidian vein  and
argued that Ram could not be an historic person and that the Ram Setu could not be an
ancient man-made bridge. During the celebration of Periyar’s 99th birth anniversary, he
declared at a public meeting at Erode: ‘Some say there was a person over 17 lakh years
ago—his name, Ram. And we should not touch the bridge (Ram Setu) he built. Who is this
Ram? From which engineering college did he graduate? Is there any proof of this?’.6 A few
days  later,  on  the  20th of  September,  he  said  that  ‘Ram is  a  big  lie’  and  then that,
according to Valmiki himself he was a drunkard.7
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28 The Sangh Parivar could not put up with such a discourse. On the other hand, its leaders
could not react to it in the way they had reacted to a minority leader like Sonia Gandhi. In
fact, the Ram Setu controversy shows how difficult it is for the Sangh Parivar to identify
and cash in on pan-Hindu symbols. While Ram is a popular symbol in the North among
almost all caste groupsit is not that prestigious in the Dravidian South, especially among
the lower castes. By activating this identity symbol, the Sangh Parivar risks alienating
other Hindus instead of unifying the majority community. Incidentally, this is why the
notion of a ‘Hindu race’ was never used by the ideologues of the Hindutva movement as it
would have introduced a line of cleavage between ‘Aryans’  and ‘Dravidians’  (Jaffrelot
1995: 327-54).
29 However the Sangh Parivar is certainly not shy of alienating some Hindus. It has been
fighting physically against communists in Kerala for decades, the RSS/CPI(M) violence
leaving dozens of dead people every year. The Bajrang Dal is also implementing a form of
cultural  policing  directed  against  Hindu artists.  In  February  2004,  activists  from the
movement filed a complaint against canvasses painted by a Hindu artist, Shail Choyal, for
an information campaign of the NGO ‘CARE’ devoted to providing care for newborns.
They particularly criticised the painter’s depiction of Hindu divinities such as Ganesh and
Krishna.  On  February  10,  their  complaint  was  registered  by  the  police  who,  in  the
company of some 50 Bajrang Dal militants, searched the offices of the director of the
Udaipur Lok Kala Mandal, the art centre where the canvasses were stored, seized the
paintings and put the director and the painter behind bars. They were later released on
bail,  but the Bajrang Dal organized a protest march during which their effigies were
burned.8
30 This cultural police’s wrath is not merely brought down on famous painters: it even hunts
down amateur artists at the local level. For instance, in Gwalior (Madhya Pradesh), the
Bajrang Dal and the Durga Vahini—the youth wing and the women wing of the VHP—
accused an employee of the Indian Institute of Tourism and Travel Management of having
staged a play, ‘Kal, Aaj aur Kal’, that showed disrespect for Sita, Ram and Laxman. On
March 14, 2004, members of these two organizations burst into the employee’s home to
blacken her face in public as punishment. Her father as well as her brothers and sisters
stepped in.  They were beaten and thrown out  of  their  house,  while  their  home was
ransacked, all under the passive gaze of police officers (Tripathi 2004: 41).
31 The depiction of the role of women in society by Hindu film makers has also resulted in
strong-arm tactics by the Bajrang Dal. In 2000, Canada-based director Deepa Mehta chose
to make a film entitled Water on the life of Hindu widows in Varanasi in the 1930s. At that
time—and even now to a lesser extent—these women were condemned to celibacy and
begging. Usually they gathered together in ‘homes’ where they lived on public charity
and eked out a living by making fuel out of cow dung. The screenplay showed an ‘illicit’
relationship  between a  Brahmin widow and an untouchable  and the  rape  of  a  child
widow. The VHP president immediately declared that the film insulted ‘ancient Indian
culture and traditions’ (The Hindu 2000) and threatened ‘more violent protest’ if Deepa
Mehta tried to shoot in India. She nevertheless, did after having secured all the necessary
authorizations from the central government and the authorities of Uttar Pradesh. The set
that was built on the banks of the Ganges was totally ransacked by Bajrang Dal militants
and the damage added to the delays accumulated on the shooting led to colossal losses
(65,000 US dollars) for the producer. 
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32 Deepa Mehta then decided to continue shooting in Madhya Pradesh where she could not
have been more warmly welcomed by the head of government at that time,  Digvijay
Singh. But here again, the Bajrang Dal resorted to force to prevent the shooting from
taking place. Deepa Mehta’s previous film, Fire, had already ignited the anger of Hindu
nationalists, as it picturized two women falling in love. The same theme was taken up in
Girlfriend, a Bollywood film, which sparked an even more violent Bajrang Dal campaign in
2004:  posters  were  torn  down  and  screenings  were  prevented  in  most  of  Mumbai’s
theatres,  a  sign that this  organization saw itself  as  a vice squad allegedly protecting
Hindu values.
33 Obviously, the Sangh Parivar has targeted Hindus outraging Hinduism before. But the Ram
Setu controversy  is  different.  For  the  first  time,  Sangh  Parivar leaders  seem to  have
identified an outraged symbol whose defence could divide Hindus in a big way. What is at
stake is not a handful of artists but sections of the Dravidian movement. Certainly, the
BJP is not too concerned by the feelings of the DMK voters given its weak electoral basis
in  Tamil  Nadu,  but  attacking  the  Dravidian  tradition  might  have  repercussions
throughout India among the Dalit and Other Backward Classes (OBC) leaders who regard
Periyar as one of their heroes – especially since Mayawati and the Bahujan Samaj Party
(BSP) tried to establish a pan-Indian presence by touring South India over the last 2-3
years. This is probably one of the main reasons why, eventually, the Sangh Parivar put the
Ram Setu issue on the back burner after a couple of demonstrations, one of them resulting
in the infamous ransacking of the flat of Karunanidhi’s daughter by Hindu nationalist
activists  in  Bangalore.  Interestingly,  instead  of  entrusting  the  VHP with  the  task  of
exploiting the Ram Setu controversy, the RSS created a new body, the Rameshwaram Ram
Setu Raksha Manch, whose very name downplays the whole exercise: it has to be a local
issue rooted in the concerns of the local people.
34 The fact that sections of the Dravidian movement did not recognise Ram as a sacred
figure also explains why the Sangh Parivar looked for other good reasons to be outraged:
what was at stake, for the organization, had to be the historical quality of the Ram Setu.
This attempt at historicising myths was part of the Hindu nationalist ideology anyway.
 
The historicization of myth: searching for the root-
cause of outrage
35 While BJP and VHP leaders insist on the sacred character of the Ram Setu in order to
mobilize people on the street, for the Sangh Parivar dignitaries who really matter – the
RSS leaders -, this ‘bridge’ needs to be preserved for other, more nationalist reasons.
36 One  contributor  to  The  Organiser Deepavali  special  issue  downplays  the  question  of
historicity and of its corollary, the scientific proof of the existence of Ram and the Ram
Setu: ‘True, when one is writing human history, tangible evidence is important. But when
one is dealing with the divine, faith is overriding. And faith has been overwhelming when
it came to Lord Ram’ (Goralia 2007: 40). In other words: there is no need to prove the
existence  of  Ram  (and  the  Ram  Setu)  with  scientific  tools  since  every  followers  of
Hinduism believe in him as a sacred figure of their religion. This argument is not put
forward by any RSS leader. Even when they emphasise the sacred nature of Ram and the
Ram Setu, they make a point to stress their historical quality too.
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History as a key element of ethno-nationalism
37 RSS leaders have not been outraged by the government’s treatment of the Ram Setu as a
religious symbol, but as a historical symbol. For these pro-Hindutva ethno-nationalists the
main pillar of the Hindu identity lays in the Vedic golden age, an historical foundation
phase which is well described in the Ramayana.  Since Golwalkar, the RSS doctrine has
been distinguishing Hinduism as a religion from Hinduism as a national way of life. The
former is considered as an element of the latter, which matters much more, in spite of its
worldly character. That is why the historical features of ancient India are so important.
Ram Madhav, the former spokesman of the RSS and a member of its executive committee,
made it  clear about the Ram Setu controversy:  its historicity had to be demonstrated
because what was at stake was the very historicity of Ram, a fundamental elements of the
Hindu nationalist identity:
Denial of historicity of Ram is denying the very identity of this nation. That may not
do any harm to our religion because as a religion we Hindus are not much bothered
about  this  historicity  question.  [...]  Hindus  are  not  a  people  driven  by  history.
Hinduism will survive any onslaught [regarding the historicity of its gods]. But as a
nation we will pay a very heavy price for questioning the existence of Ram, the
Imam-e-Hind [sic] (Madhav 2007: 45).
38 For the RSS leaders the preservation of Hinduism is not enough and the real objective is
the building of the Hindu nation, the Hindu rashtra. To achieve this goal, they rely on the
Vedic golden age, a civilizational founding moment that simply has to be revived. RSS
leaders are keen to cite Swami Dayananda, one of the key ideologues in the making of this
myth of a Vedic golden age, and some of his epigones, like Benjamin Khan who wrote:
We find that Valmiki depicts a society where women are held in honour, a society
which is free from the horrors of the Sati system, a society in which child-marriage
is unknown and maidens are free to chose their husbands. It was a society with
political and economical freedom where men had their proper occupations (...). The
caste system had not assumed the rigidity it acquired later; it was only an economic
device  and  not  a  birth-principle.  (...)  Valmiki  did  not  hesitate  to  condemn  the
doctrine of Fate, which was rendering the nation impotent. He ridiculed all those
who pinned their faith to destiny and lowered the value of human efforts. For him,
it  is  human  will  which  is  the  spring  of  all  human  action  and  even  if  there  is
anything like destiny, it can be made to change its course by man’s prowess (Khan
1983, Balanshankar 2007: 9).
39 This reading of the Vedic period is a clear invention of the past emulating the mainstays
of  the West:  the underlying values which are refered to in this  excerpt are those of
Western individualism.
 
Ram, as the alter ego of Jesus and Mohammed 
40 Suffering from a deep sense of vulnerability, the Hindutva leaders have always tried to
imitate the cultural features of Others—including the West—which would confer prestige
and/or a reputation of effectiveness on them. While child-marriage and the caste system
suffered from an unanimous opprobrium, individual freedom was universally revered and
therefore the Vedic golden age had to incorporate this quality. This reasoning is a core
element of the Hindu nationalist strategy of stigmatising and emulating strong Others,
including those who represent a threat to Hindus. Ram Madhav’s plea in favour of the
historicity of Ram must be seen in this very perspective: Ram has to be revered as a
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historical  figure  because  the  religions  displaying  the  greatest  dynamism  today,  i.e.
Christianity and Islam according to him, are based on the teachings of historical men,
Jesus Christ and Mohammed: ‘Remove historicity from Jesus’s life or remove Bethlehem
and  Jerusalem  from  his  history,  Christianity  will  collapse.  Remove  historicity  from
Prophet Mohammed, Islam will collapse’ (Madhav 2007: 45). 
41 In fact, all the semitic religions are seen as role models, including Judaism, a creed rooted
in history and supporting a committed nation-state. Visiting Israel during the Ram Setu
controversy,  Madhav was  struck by  the  emotional  and political  weight  given by the
government placed to the historical religious sites. He contrasted this with the attitude of
the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) rulers: ‘Here is a nation that I am visiting—proud of
its Millenia old history and heritage; and here is the nation to which I belong—writhing in
self-denial  and self-hate’  (Madhav 2007:  44).  Here/there,  us/them (...)  the strategy of
stigmatization and emulation of Others relies on repetitive, even obsessive, comparisons.
Though  Jews  have  become  role  models  for  the  proponents  of  Hindutva,  given  their
remarkable resilience in the midst of an Islamic hostile milieu, emulating Christians and
Muslims remains more relevant since they are seen as a direct threat to Hindus who thus
need to borrow from them in order to counter them. Now, these two religions cash in on
the historicity not only of religious figures but also of sacred sites like Bethlehem, the
Vatican, Medina and Mecca. For the RSS leaders, Hinduism must similarly recognise the
historicity of sacred places such as the Ram Setu.
 
Looking for scientific proofs
42 The first set of proofs mobilized by the Hindu nationalists are ‘the archaeological findings
[... which] substantiate historicity of Lord Ram’ (Gupta 2007: 12). O. P. Gupta enlists XVIth
century coins embossed with figures of  Lord Ram, Egyptian tablets  depicting ‘stories
similar to those in the Ramayana’ (Gupta 2007: 12) and Maya tablets of the same kind—as if
that was enough to establish the historicity of Ram.
43 The second set of proofs comes from the British writings.  Dinesh Chandra Tyagi,  the
General secretary of the Hindu Mahasabha, another Hindu nationalist party— the oldest
one in fact—bluntly writes:
As far as the historicity of Ram Setu is concerned, it is proved in Madras Presidency
Glossary edited by C.D. Maclean and Survey of India (1767). Ram Setu’s name was
changed to Adam Bridge but the documentary proof given by the British Library
and Glossary claim that this bridge connects Ceylon to Peninsula of India and it
really joined the two countries until 1480, when a breach was made through the
rocks  during  a  storm.  Length  of  the  Sethu  about  30  miles,  breadth  1.25  miles,
direction South-West South-East to North-West is depicted in the document, partly
above and partly below water, but usually 4 feet above the sea level was visible
mostly. Thus the proof is visible and uncontroversial but politically-closed eyes of
the UPA leaders could not see it (Tyagi 2007: 79). 
44 Dr. S. Kalyana Raman, the Director a the Saraswati Research Centre and the President of
the  Rameshwaram  Ram  Setu Raksha  Manch,  refers  to  the  travelogue  of  Alexander
Hamilton, entitled A New Account of the West Indies which, in 1744 describes on page 338 his
visit to Ceylon by crossing the bridge. Raman also refers to another edition of Maclean’s
book— C.D. Maclean, Manual of the Administration of the Madras Presidency, New Delhi, AES,
3 vols., 1903, 2440 p.—where he read that the bridge ‘really joined Ceylon to India until
1480,  when  a  breach  was  made  through  rocks  during  a  storm.  A  subsequent  storm
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enlarged this and foot traffic then ceased’ (Raman 2007: 22). The importance somewhat
naively attached to Western sources—that I noticed in my essay on the emulation of the
Western criteria of ‘what is a nation’ by the Hindu nationalists—is confirmed here. His
Holiness  Swami  Chidanand Saraswati  even writes:  ‘The  bridge  clearly  exists  and has
earned even a place in the Encyclopaedia Britannica’ (Saraswati 2007: 58)
45 The third set of proofs derives from satellite photographs. The (re)discovery of the Ram
Setu by Hindu nationalists seems to have taken place in 1997 when one old timer of the
RSS, Chamanlal, saw a picture of a current NASA’s photo exhibition in Delhi that showed
‘the picture of Ram Setu’. He then contacted Uma Bharti, the then Union Minister of Coal
and  Mines  who  sent  a  team  of  scientists  from  her  administration.  They  went  to
Rameshwaram and ‘confirmed the underwater formation of rocks attached to each others
and described those rocks as old as one lakh years’ (Bharti 2007: 74). These ‘two scientific
sources’—to  use  the  words  of  Subramanian  Swamy—have  been  quoted  ad  nauseam
afterwards: the NASA’s photographs have been repeatedly presented as establishing ‘the
Sethu’s existence as a chain of shoal stones’ and the Department of Earth Science of the
Government  of  India  stated  that  these  stones  had  been  ‘deliberately  placed  there’
(Swamy 2007: 70). Of the two, the NASA photographs, have been referred more often. For
instance,  the  web  site  of  Hindu  Janajagruti  Samiti,  an  offshoot  of  the  Sangh  Parivar
explains:
Pictures taken by NASA (USA) from space show the remains of what appears to be
an age old man-made bridge between Rameshwaram and Sri Lanka. According to
Hindu scriptures and belief, Lord Ram and his vanaar sena had built a bridge from
Rameshwaram  to  Sri  Lanka  about  17  lacs  [sic]  25  thousands  years  ago.  The
discovery of Shri Ram Setu by NASA confirms that Hindu scriptures and belief are
correct in this matter and that Ramayana is history and not ‘mythology’ as is often
construed.9
46 The NASA had to clarify repeatedly that these photographs had been misinterpreted by
the Sangh Parivar. The NASA spokesman, Michael Braukus declared: ‘Some people have
taken pictures by our astronauts to make their claim. No position can be taken on the
basis of these photographs in any way’. In 2002, Mark Hess, a NASA official, had already
stated  that  ‘the  mysterious  bridge  was  nothing  more than  a  30  km long,  naturally-
occurring chain of sandbanks called ‘Adam’s bridge’. NASA had been taking pictures of
these shoals for years.  Its images of these shoals had never resulted in any scientific
discovery in the area’.10
47 But Hindu nationalists do not care. Mixing Sanskrit and ‘scientific’ sources, Subramanian
Swamy concludes:  ‘The Ram Setu formation is as if  it  was constructed in the manner
described  in  the  Ramayana authored  by  Valmiki,  Kamban  and  Tulsidas.  The  bridge
formation by placing these stones one by one, according to the Earth Science Department
of the government is not less than 9000 years’.11
48 In short, the main outrage felt by the Hindu nationalists in the Ram Setu controversy is
not due to the sacred nature of this ‘bridge’, but to its historicity. For them, the denial of
a prestigious past is more problematic because it questions the chief foundation of their
political project: the revival of the Hindu rashtra of the Vedic Golden Age. Such an attitude
is not new. During the Ramjanmabhoomi movement, which focused on the ‘liberation’ of
Ram in Ayodhya from the mid-1980s till 1992, the Sangh Parivar had tried hard to prove
that a Ram temple had existed in place of the Babri Masjid, by looking for archaeological
vestiges below its foundations.
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 The efficiency argument
On the utility of Ram Setu
49 According to the Hindu nationalist leaders, the Ram Setu had to be preserved for practical
reasons too. None of these leaders mention its sacred and historical nature as a sufficient
reason for preserving it. For O. P. Gupta, ‘it is common sense that a breach in the Ram Setu
will allow tsunamis to make direct hits at the Kerala and Southern Tamil coasts with full
force inflicting more casualties and more loss of lives than without the breach’ (Gupta
2007: 11).
50 Gautam Sen refers to the ‘unknown and potentially huge environmental costs that the
project  might  impose  on  future  generations’  (Sen  2007:  17).  ‘His  Holiness  Swami
Chidanand  Saraswati’  argues  along  the  same  lines  that  ‘even  from  a  strictly
environmental perspective,  to destroy the bridge and open the area for sea traffic is
paving the way for environmental disaster’ (Saraswati 2007: 59).
51 ‘His Holiness’ Sadhvi Rithambara gives the longest lists of reasons why the Ram Setu needs
to be saved:
Apart from its spiritual significance, Ram Setu’s other attributes are more scientific
and have a significant security value for the nation as it contains rich reserve of
thorium, which is used as a nuclear fuel. Over the centuries, Ram Setu has served as
a  natural  barrier  against  tsunamis.  When  the  waves  of  the  last  tsunami  were
swallowing up the residents of the islands and India’s coastal areas, it was this Ram
Setu, which stopped the dangerous waves from reaching Tamil Nadu and beyond. By
far  the  greatest  feature  of  Ram  Setu has  to  be  its  strategic  location,  which  has
provided a natural security cordon against enemy ships as it prevents anti-Indian
terrorists from entering Indian ports undetected (Rithambara 2007: 63).
52 Uma Bharti—who shared the VHP dais so often during the Ramjanmabhoomi movement—
cashes in on similar arguments but adds an economic one:
The destruction of Ram Setu is not only an insult to Indian culture, but it will also
deprive lakhs of fishermen of their livelihood and will also present a grave threat to
our national security. Most of the cadres of LTTE, who cross over to Tamil Nadu
from Sri Lanka posing as refugees, reside in the nearby areas of Rameswaram. They
indulge in the smuggling and sell their weapons to Islamic terrorists (Bharti 2007:
74).
53 The  economic  argument  remains  unconvincing  since  the  correlation  between  the
dredging of the Ram Setu and the decline of the fishing activities is not clear at all, but
such an argument is nonetheless common in the Hindu nationalist rhetoric.
 
The anti cow-slaughter movement revisited
54 Hindu nationalists have usually found it important to substantiate their claim regarding a
sacred  symbol  by  underlying  its practical—and  especially  its  economic—utility.  For
instance, the cow protection movement relied on sacred elements and a strong plea in
favour of the economic assets of this animal,  as if its sacredness was not a sufficient
reason for protecting it. This ambivalence is evident from the attitude of the Jana Sangh
during the 1966-67 anti cow-slaughter campaign.
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55 In 1966, VHP leaders created the Sarvadaliya Goraksha Maha-Abhiyan Samiti (SGMS, All-
Party Cow-Protection Great-Campaign Committee)  in order to mobilize Hindus in the
street and force the Congress-led government to reform the Constitution by making cow-
slaughter illegal. Saffron-clad leaders gathered with a huge crowd of 100 000 people in
front  of  Parliament  in  order  to  put  pressure  on  the  MPs.  Once  again,  the  VHP
demonstrated its skill for tapping popular sentiments.
56 The Jana Sangh adopted a more complex strategy. On the one hand, it supported the
VHP’s argument that allowing cow-slaughter was an insult to Hinduism. But it underlined
the economic dimension of the issue. That remained its standard attitude for years. In
1954 already, its election manifesto read:
Cow  is  our  point  of  honour,  and  the  eternal  symbol  of  our  culture.  Since
immemorial times it has been protected and worshipped. Our economy too, is based
on the cow. Cow-protection therefore, is not only a pious duty but an indispensable
need.  It  is  impossible  to  protect  and  improve  cattle  so  long  as  its  slaughter
continues (Bharatiya Jana Sangh 1973: 68).
57 The 1951 manifesto already said: ‘The party stands pledged to the prohibition of cow-
slaughter.  Special  steps  will  be  taken  to  improve  the  breeds  of  cow  to  make  it  an
economic  unit  in  our  agricultural  life’(Bharatiya  Jana  Sangh  1973:  52).  In  the  1957
manifesto, the relevant paragraph starts with the same ambivalent wording: ‘Respecting
the  sentiments  of  the  people  of  Bharat,  and taking into  consideration the  economic
importance of the cow, Jana Sangh will try to get Central legislation enacted to ban cow-
slaughter  throughout  the  country’  (Bharatiya  Jana  Sangh  1973:  119).  In  the  1962
manifesto,  the  first  21  lines  of  the  paragraph  entitled  ‘Cow-protection  and  animal
husbandry’  are  devoted  to  cattle  breeding,  milk  production  and  marketing  of  dairy
products. The only mention of the need to legally forbid cow-slaughter came in the last 2
lines, and almost as a matter of fact (Bharatiya Jana Sangh 1973: 135-6). Naturally, the
1967 manifesto returns to a more balanced approach by stating: ‘The cow is our national
point of honour. It is also the basis of India’s agriculture. Bharatiya Jana Sangh will amend
the Constitution and impose a legal ban on the slaughter of the cow and its progeny’
(Bharatiya Jana Sangh 1973: 163).
58 The constant  oscillation of  the Jana Sangh between the argument  of  sacredness  and
others pertaining to the economic repertoire is very revealing of the fact that, even for
the holy cow,  the religious motivations were not enough:  to be complete,  the Hindu
nationalist response to an outrage needs to address practical dimensions too. This is even
more remarkable in this case since the economic rational would in fact have led to the
slaughter of the old and sick cows which had become useless.12
 
Conclusion
59 Hindu nationalists  have become experts in the art  of  being outraged.  In pre-modern
India, blasphemous attitude of Muslims and Christians provoked violent reactions by the
majority  community  (and  vice-versa).  After  the  crystallization  of  ethno-nationalist
ideologies  during  the  British  Raj,  Hindu  nationalists,  who  articulated  a  deep  rooted
inferiority complex, have tried hard to catch minorities out while insulting the sacred
symbols  of  their  religions.  To  denounce  a  disrespectful  behaviour  or  to  give  some
substance to one’s complaints on the basis of rumours enabled the Sangh Parivar members
to polarise society along communal lines and to mobilize new followers. Such a process
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was likely to trigger riots and to translate into votes for the Hindu Mahasabha, the Shiv
Sena, the Jana Sangh and then the BJP, the main Hindu nationalist parties. This standard
scenario worked rather well in the case of the Ramjanmabhoomi movement when the
Hindu nationalist leaders denounced the way the birth place of Ram had supposedly been
colonised by Muslim invaders who were also accused of having destroyed the temple built
there before and of keeping Ram prisoner of the Mosque that replaced it. During the first
phase of the Ramjanmabhoomi movement, in 1984, VHP activists started a procession
from Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh to Sitarmahi in Bihar with a lorry bearing large statues of
Ram  and  Sita  behind  bars  (Van  der  Veer  1987).  Five  years  later,  the  Sangh  Parivar
orchestrated  dozens  of  communal  riots  during  the  Ram  Shila  Pujas—  ceremonial
consecrations of bricks named after Ram; and in the 1990s, the BJP surfed on the ‘saffron
wave’, to use Thomas Blom Hansen’s metaphor.
60 However, a purely instrumentalist interpretation of the Hindu nationalist use of outrage
would  be  too  simplistic.  First,  the  sentiment  of  vulnerability  is  such  among  Hindu
nationalists that they sometimes really feel victimised. Second, and more importantly,
the use of  sacred symbols  is  not  that  easy,  as  this  case study reveals.  The Ram Setu
movement shows that the Sangh Parivar finds it more difficult to mobilize followers when
the culprits are not Muslims—then, they must at least be Christians as the attack against
Sonia  Gandhi  mentioned above  suggested.  It  also  shows that  the  exploitation of  the
outrage is more complicated when its instigators are born Hindus. Sangh Parivar members
have already attacked other Hindus—be they communists or ‘deviant’ artists—but in the
case under study, they had to face sections of the Dravidian movement associated with
Dalits whom the Hindu nationalists cannot afford to alienate. This social caveat harks
back to a geographical one: not only is it difficult to mobilize against Hindus but it is also
difficult to mobilize Hindus who do not regard the identity symbol that the Sangh Parivar
was manipulating as sacred: in Tamil Nadu, Ram is not as popular as in the North and
there are indeed very few pan-Hindu symbols.
61 In  any  case,  sacredness  is  not  the  only  source  of  the  outrage  ‘felt’  by  the  Hindu
nationalists.  This is the second series of conclusions I would draw from the Ram Setu
story. Ideologues of the RSS are prompt to highlight the historical dimension of Ram and
its Setu: they do not care so much for their sacredness. Their historicity matters more
because  it  is  the  foundation-stone  of  Hindu  nationalism—which,  like  any  ethno-
nationalism, needs real heroes—and it is the only way to be on a par with competing
civilization whose key figures—Jesus and Mohammad—are located in human history.
62 The holy character of the outraged symbol is not enough: it has to be historical; and it has
to be useful too. The Ram Setu,  therefore, is also defended for economic and strategic
reasons, even by saffron-clad leaders who may have found it sufficient to consider that it
was  a  sacred  cause.  Such  a  modus  operandi was  also  observed  during  the  anti  cow-
slaughter movement in the 1960s. It suggests that the Hindu attitude vis-à-vis sacredness
is not the same as the one we see in other cultures where nobody feels the need to invoke
non-religious arguments. In Islam, for instance, the sacredness of Mecca is self-sufficient
and its defence does not need to be supported by additional arguments.
63 Epilogue:  the  Congress-led  government  withdrew  the  affidavit  it  had  filed  with  the
Supreme Court after the start of the Sangh Parivar agitation in order to defuse any such
mobilization in a sensitive election year. Instead, it has left it up to the Court to validate
or not the Sethusamudram Project (July 2008).
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NOTES
1. See ‘History’, http://sethusamudram.info/content/view/18/26
2. ‘Tuticorin Port vs Colombo Port’, http://sethusamudram.info/content/view/26/30 
3. ‘Tuticorin port has potential  to be global  container hub—PricewaterhouseCoopers’,  http://
sethusamudram.info/content/view/25/30 
4. They were not the first one to mobilize. Swami Avimukteshwaranand Saraswati, one of the
main disciples of the Shankaracharya of Dwarka and Jyotirpith, launched a campaign with his
own, limited means. (Personal communication of an unpublished letter sent on the 29th Sept.
2007  to  India  Today and  Outlook by  Alvara  Enterria,  Publications  Director  of  Indica  Books,
Varanasi).
5. On  the  protests  orchestrated  by  the  Hindu  Janajagruti  Samiti,  see  http://
www.hindujagruti.org/activities/campaigns/religious/ramsetu/
6. ‘Tamils  celebrate  Ravana  as  a  hero  and  Rama  as  the  villain’,  Outlook,  cited  in  http://
sethusamudram.info/content/view/42/26
7. To  quote  Karunanidhi  fully,  in  response  to  L.K.Advani,  the BJP  leader,  who asked him to
apologize after his initial statements, the DMK chief said: ‘I have not said anything more than
Valmiki, who authored the Ramayana. Valmiki has even stated that Ram was drunkard. Have I
said so?’  (Cited in ‘Cong chants ‘Ram, Ram’ on Sethu row’,  The Economic Times,  22 September
2007). 
8. PUCL, Cultural policing by Bajrang Dal and the Rajasthan police’, http://www.pucl.org/Topics/
Religion-communalism
9. ‘What is Setu (Sethu) Samudram Project’, http://www.hindujagruti.org/activities/campaigns/
religious/ramsethu/ 
10. ‘Space  photo  no  proof  of  Ram  Sethu:  NASA’,  http://sethusamudram.info/content/view/
66/26
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11. ‘Space  photo  no  proof  of  Ram  Sethu:  NASA’,  http://sethusamudram.info/content/view/
66/26
12. This  is  exactly  the  reason  why  the  Supreme  Court  had  considered  that  it  would  be
unreasonable to ban cow-slaughter in the Constitution if India in its 1958 decision. 
ABSTRACTS
Hindu nationalists have become experts in the art of being outraged after the crystallization of
the Hindutva ideology in the 1920s. Articulating a deeprooted inferiority complex, they have tried
hard to denounce the disrespectful behaviour of the minorities they feared most—especially the
Muslims—in order to mobilize new followers. Such a process was likely to trigger riots and to
polarise society along communal lines—and eventually to translate into votes. However, a purely
instrumentalist interpretation of the Hindu nationalist use of outrage would be too simplistic.
The use of sacred symbols is not that easy, as evident from the case of the Ram Setu movement. It
shows that the Sangh Parivar finds it more difficult to mobilize followers when the culprits are
not Muslims. It also shows that the exploitation of the outrage is more complicated when its
instigators  are  born  Hindus. In  any  case,  the  holy  character  of  the outraged  symbol  is  not
enough: it has to be historical; and it has to be useful too.
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